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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The issue for determination by this Court is whether
Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-24

applies to plaintiffs, a group of

former State employees who were disqualified from participation in
the Utah State Retirement system when their public employer was sold
to a private entity.

Plaintiffs have submitted to the Court their

argument that the statute does not apply because mass
disqualification caused by an entire unit being forced to withdraw
was neither anticipated nor contemplated by the provisions of the
Retirement Act.

In their brief, plaintiffs set forth the following

four-part analysis showing the inapplicability of § 49-10-24 and
demonstrating plaintiffs' right to restitution of employer
contributions made on their behalf.

Plaintiffs submit that this

unrebutted analysis compels reversal of the summary judgment
rendered below.
1. Plaintiffs1 employer contributions were
compensation in the form of "deferred wages".
2. Plaintiffs1 interests in their deferred wages are
entitled to legal protection even before plaintiffs attain
"vested benefits".
3. Although plaintiffs normally would have to satisfy
the pension system's statutory vesting schedule before enjoying
their deferred wages, unanticipated circumstances which render
such satisfaction impossible give plaintiffs an immediate
equitable claim for restitution.
4.
The Retirement Act completely failed to
contemplate the mass disqualification and forfeiture caused by
the sale of Payson City Hospital to an ineligible private
corporation.
Plaintiffs do not wish to further burden the Court with a
detailed discussion of the points made in its initial brief.
-1Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Instead, plaintiffs note only that they are relying on the sound
analysis presented above and discussed in detail in their initial
brief and herein will discuss only briefly defendant's unfounded
collateral objections.
Defendant has chosen to sidestep almost completely
plaintiffs1 four points, instead attempting to distract the Court
from the main issue by raising collateral issues, using unfounded
scare tactics about the possible effect of a ruling in plaintiffs'
favor, making sweeping unsupported generalizations and bald
conclusions, and misinterpreting and misapplying case law.
Defendant makes unjustified quantum leaps of logic to
arrive at its conclusion that summary judgment should be upheld.
First, demonstrating either bravado or its inability to rebut
plaintiffs1 arguments, defendant refuses to "distinguish or attack
the legal sanctity" of plaintiffs' private retirement system cases,
observing that public retirement systems are not private retirement
systems.

(Respondents' Brief at 3). Plaintiffs show in Section I

that the uncontemplated mass withdrawal presents identical problems
in public or private systems and that the law allows recovery of
employer contributions in such instances.
Second, defendant proposes that because the Utah State
Retirement System is a Defined Benefit Plan that plaintiffs' desired
recovery is somehow inappropriate.

In Section II, plaintiffs

demonstrate that their analysis is entirely consistent with a
"Defined Benefit Plan" and that this issue is a "red herring" having
little, if anything, to do with the issues before this Court.
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Third, defendant submits that Bryson v. Utah State
Retirement Office 573 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1978), is controlling in
this case.

Section III will show that not only is defendant's

all-or-nothing reliance on Bryson seriously misplaced but also
defendant's other cited cases miss the mark, dealing either with
demands by individual terminated employees in the face of statutes
expressly forbidding any refund, or with claims for denied pension
benefits -- neither applicable in this instance.
Fourth, defendant argues that somehow "equity" cannot be
relied on by plaintiffs because "he who seeks equity must do
equity."

(Respondent's Brief at 12)

While it is difficult to

understand defendant's equity argument, it appears to be an attempt
to quantify the amount of harm (benefit) Payson City's withdrawal
had on the retirement system.

Plaintiffs show in Section IV that

this issue must await trial and is not now before this Court for
determination.
Finally, defendant argues that the enactment of § 49-10-11
indicates that the 1967 Retirement Act did not contemplate mass
termination and forfeiture.

Plaintiffs1 final section will show

that, at best, the 1983 modification was a recognition of the
deficiency in

S 49-10-24 which plaintiffs claim entitles them to

relief.
Defendant's attempts to flavor its vapid arguments by
sweeping unsupported statements, i.e. "It would be a direct reversal
of the law in this jurisdiction and in every other jurisdiction in
these United States (where it was followed) as it relates to public
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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defined benefit plans." (Respondent's Brief at 7.); "The whole
funding base would have to be reconsidered and recalculated."
(Respondent's Brief at 7.); "Neither law nor equity is of aid to
these plaintiffs' as they seek to recover sums universally denied
public employees under defined benefit plans in the jurisidictions
of the United States."

Respondent's Brief at 15; fail to breathe

life into defendant's arguments, none of which are of value in
determining whether § 49-10-24 of the Utah State Retirement Act
contemplated the mass disqualification of plaintiffs.

In fact,

defendant has admitted that the 1967 Legislature had never expressly
considered this possibility.

(Statement of Proceedings For Which No

Transcript Was Made, Addendum to Brief of Appellants 2-4).
The summary judgment below must be reversed and plaintiffs
allowed to prove the amount, if any, to which they are entitled.
I.

PRIVATE PENSION CASES ARE APPLICABLE

Because defendant has chosen not to discuss or dispute
plaintiffs' cases involving private retirement systems, such case
law stands unrebutted before this court if defendant's distinction
between private and public cases is faulty.

Plaintiffs submit that

such distinction is not only faulty, it is almost nonexistent.
At page 3 of its Brief, defendant states its only basis of
distinction —

a public retirement system is "created and governed

by legislative authority and not 'negotiation' and 'contract' as in
private systems."

On this thin reed of distinction hangs^

defendant's response and plaintiffs' only obstacle to relief, for
the cases of Lucas v. Seagrave, 277 F. Supp. 338 (D. Minn.
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1967), Kenneke v, First National Bank of Chicago, 105 111. App.
3d 630, 434 N.E.2d 495 (1982), prior appeal 65 111. App. 3d 10,
382 N.E.2d 309 (1978), and Longhine v. Bilson, 159 Misc. Ill,
287 N.Y.S. 281 (1936), as well as Bernstein, Employee
Pension Rights When Plants Shut Down, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 952
(1963) are authority directly on point allowing plaintiffs1 recovery.
Defendant's bald assertion notwithstanding, it is clear
that public pension systems are contractual as well as statutory.
The relationship of the parties under the Utah State Retirement
Act is contractual as well as statutory. Driggs y. Utah
State Teachers Retirement Board, 105 Utah 417, 422, 434, 142
P.2d 657, 659, 664 (1943); Cfty of West Jordan v. Utah State
Retirement Office, Civ. No. C82-6157, Memorandum Decision,
at 6 (3d. Jud. Dist. Ct. Utah July 29, 1983) (record at 319).
The defendant argued below that private pension cases such as
Lucas, Longhine and Kenneke are irrelevant in an
action against a public pension fund. This Court, however,
specifically rejected that argument in Driggs, 105 Utah at
427-28, 142 P.2d at 661-62.
Brief of Appellants at 22, n. 3.
As has been previously pointed out, under Utah's retirement
system the proportion of contributions paid by employees and
employers is the subject of negotiation at the legislative level.
For example, participating public employers contribute more than
employees in the Public Safety Retirement System, the Firemen
Retirement System and the Judges' Retirement System; but employer
and employee contributions are equal in the Public Employees Utah
State Retirement System.

Deposition of Burt Hunsaker at 43, 44.

Defendant has admitted that the basis for the discrepancy.between
the retirement funds is "[njegotiation by the individual groups when

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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establishing a program.

The law being an effort at the legislature,

a compromise between employer and employees."

Id.

The promise of a particular contribution level by employer
and employee acts as inducement to prospective employees to become
employees.

Employees rely on the represented level of contribution

when they accept the offer of employment.

Attempts to change the

terms of this contract without the employees' consent have failed.
See e.g., Driggs, 105 Utah 417.
It should be noted that even the cases cited by the
defendant (Brief of Respondent at 9 ) , although irrelevant for
determining the scope of plaintiffs1 rights in a mass termination
suit, note that public pension systems are by nature contractual.
It is therefore clear that the public retirement system,
while created by legislative authority, is also subject to
"negotiation" and "contract" as in the private system.

Plaintiffs1

private cases are thus applicable and controlling in the absence of
authority to the contrary.

Plaintiffs submit that Lucas,

Kenneke and Longhine should be examined carefully by this
Court as they are sufficient authority for plaintiffs to prevail in
this case.i/

h/
Defendant's statement that restitution has not
been awarded to employees suffering mass termination in any public
pension case is true because the principles recognized in
plaintiffs' private pension cases have not been advanced against a
public pension in any reported case. It is equally true that there
is no public case supporting defendant's position. However, in
light of Driggs and in the absence of any reasoning in
defendant's brief, plaintiffs' private pension cases must control
and dictate relief for plaintiffs.
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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II.

DEFENDANT'S DEFINED BENEFIT - DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION DISTINCTION IS MEANINGLESS

Defendant goes to great lengths attempting to draw a
distinction between a defined benefit plan and a defined
contribution plan.

While such distinction is interesting, it is

entirely unhelpful in resolving the issue before this Court and, in
fact, seem to be a "red herring" which could distract the Court.
Simply stated, plaintiffs1 claims are not dependent upon
the nature or type of retirement plan.

Plaintiffs seek relief

from the plan because their circumstance was not contemplated
nor forseen, they do not seek relief through a defined benefit
plan or defined contribution plan.

If the defined benefit plan or

defined contribution plan provided for mass termination, then the
relief sought by plaintiffs is consistent with such plan; but since
plaintiffs' claim is that § 49-10-24 does not provide for mass
termination, the distinction between the two types of plans is
irrelevant.
Other authorities do not distinguish between types of
plans.

In 26 U.S.C. S 411(d)(3) the ERISA requirements for

immediate vesting upon partial termination caused by mass discharge
of employees apply regardless of whether the pension plan is defined
benefit or contribution.

Additionally defendant's purported

distinction is not raised in any pension case similar to the present
one.
Defendant emphasizes that in a defined benefit plan, the
risk of investment is on the State.

The corollary to this statement

-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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is that any unanticipated forfeitures inure to the benefit of the
State.

The Utah State Retirement System is funded on an assumption

of normal individual employee turnover.
5.)

(See Brief of Appellant at

If mass forfeiture by a disqualified class exceeds normal

employee turnover, then the State is not required to contribute as
much money to fund the pension system.

In such a situation the fund

has collected money on an assumption that fewer people would leave
(resulting in higher contributions) than actually left.

When the

mass termination occurs, a windfall to the system results.

Mass

forfeitures permit the employer to save substantial amounts of money
in contribution obligations.
Defendant argues that

fl

[t]he actuarial rate is determined

and the employer-employee contributions fixed in a defined benefit
plan upon the assumption that the employer contribution is in all
cases, other than to receive benefits of the plan, nonrefundable."
Defendant then predicts severe mischief if the Court disturbs this
actuarial assumption.

The Lucas decision shows the error in

this falsely ominous argument,
[I]t has been asserted that an employer's pension plan
contributions are determined by an actuarial formula which
assumes that any employee whose employment is terminated
forfeits his pension benefits. [citation ommitted] However,
such an assumption may not cover the occurrence of a group
termination. The actuarial formula assumes a reasonable
turnover rate for employees established by experience with
individual separations over a period of time. Where there is a
termination of a substantial number of the plan participants, it
seems clear that such a turnover is not anticipated by the
formula. The result is that an employer who has discharged a
relatively large number of employees receives a windfall,
palpably in excess of actuarial assumptions, in the form of
-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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pension credit forfeitures which he can use to relieve for some
time his future premium liability for the remaining employees.
Lucas, 277 F. Supp. at 345.
Plaintiffs submit that in any event the actuarial rate
issue is not before the Court and consideration of it should be
reserved for trial of the amount recoverable by plaintiffs.
III.

DEFENDANT'S LEGAL AUTHORITY IS NOT CONTROLLING

Defendant's heavy reliance on Bryson v. Utah State
Retirement Office, 573 P. 2d 1280 (Utah 1978) is unfounded.
Bryson simply held that it is not a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause to provide refunds for policeman and fireman which
are different than refunds for other types of public employees.

The

Court's straight-forward ruling could not be interpreted to stand
for the proposition that employee contributions (and therefore
employer contributions) are not employee "property".

Bryson

does not define the scope of employee rights relative to
contributions.

Its holding rests on a finding of a reasonable

classification scheme and not on the existence or non-existence of
"property" rights.

The nature of plaintiffs' rights to

contributions is covered fully in their initial brief and is
supported by Utah case law as well as general legal authority.
(See, Brief of Appellants at 13-18.)
This case involves no constitutional issues, and none was
argued in the summary judgment below.

Instead, this case turns upon

interpretation of Utah Code Ann. S 49-10-24; specifically
whether it contemplated.mass disqualification of an entire employee
-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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work force.

The Bryson case was simply a different case

involving different issues.
The other cases cited by defendants are equally
inapplicable to the instant case.

Defendant cites numerous cases

for the proposition that no terminating public employee has received
a refund of employer contributions.
14.)

(Brief of Respondent at 9,

All of the cases cited concern constitutional claims and fall

into two entirely distinguishable categories —

claims for denied

pension benefits, e.g., Duff v. City of Gardena, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 4, (1980), or demands for refunds by individual terminated
employees in the face of statutes expressly forbidding any refunds,
e.g. Stevens v. Board of Trustees of the Police
Pension Fund of the City of Shreveport, 370 S.2d 528 ( 1979).
All defendant's cases involved terminations of individual
employees in the regular course of their employment, none involved
mass terminations or unforseen circumstances.

Each is

constitutional in nature, attacking the validity of the forfeiture
provision rather than the applicability of the provision to
unforseen mass termination.
IV.

PLAINTIFFS' EQUITABLE CLAIM IS PROPER

Defendant makes two arguments why plaintiffs should not be
entitled to seek relief in equity.

First, defendant points to

certain liabilities which it has incurred on behalf of employees of
Payson City Hospital.

These liabilities are not inconsistent with a

request for restitution.

Defendant's argument simply raises the

question of how its unjust enrichment should be measured.
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Plaintiffs recognize the possibility that defendant may be
entitled to certain set-offs in the ultimate accounting.

The

propriety of any particular set-off, however, has not yet been
briefed by the parties because plaintiffs1 motion for partial
summary judgment reserved the determination of the amount of
recovery for trial.

The record indicates that such determination

will likely require the assistance of actuarial expertise.
(Comparison of testimony by Kent Cannon and Robert Wilcox before the
Utah State Retirement Board, record at 143-47.)

In any event, the

Lucas court clearly stated that recovery in the mass termination
context "is actuarially manageable" and "will not act to dilute the
interests of the employees who remain participants."

277 F. Supp.

at 346.
Second, defendant argues that equitable relief is not
available if the statute expressly limits available relief.
Obviously, this argument merely begs the question.

The very relief

sought by plaintiffs in their motion is a declaration that § 49-10-24
is inapplicable under the circumstances.
V.

THE 1983 ENACTMENT OF § 49-10-11 DOES NOT
INDICATE THAT THE 1967 RETIREMENT ACT
CONTEMPLATED MASS TERMINATION AND FORFEITURE

Defendant's suggestion that Senate Bill 327 (1983 Utah
Laws Ch. 224, S§ 6, 12, codified at Utah Code Ann.
§ 49-10-11(4)) demonstrates that the Retirement Act has always
applied to mass terminations, is unfounded.

Defendant relies on the

title of Senate Bill 327, not itself law, for the proposition
that the new S 49-10-11(4) merely "clarifies" the intended scope of
-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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S 49-10-24.

The time frame of this purported "clarificaton" is

extremely important:

Section 49-10-24 was passed in 1967.

Plaintiffs filed this suit in 1978.

This Court issued a written

opinion regarding this case, dated November 25, 1980.

Finally 16

years after the original legislation was passed and 5 years
after this lawsuit was filed and gained considerable attention, the
legislature began giving consideration to the problem of
disqualified employer units.
Defendant's claim that the 1983 amendment merely expresses
what the 1967 legislature clearly understood is not supportable.

As

set forth in Appellant's Brief (pp. 23-26), defendant has admitted
that the 1967 legislature never even thought about the problem
involved in this case.
Plaintiffs would agree that the 1983 legislature could
choose to place the risk of future employer unit disqualification
and mass terminations on the public employees.

That is in fact the

logical meaning of Senate Bill 327fs "clarification."

Under no

circumstances, however, can risks that were never allocated under
the pension system between 1967 and 1983 be retroactively
distributed to negate plaintiffs1 cause of action.
Ann. § 68-3-3.

Utah Code

This Court must assume that the 1983 legislature

acted properly by recognizing an existing problem and then
legislating future rights.
Finally, defendant argues that the language of § 49-10-24
is clear in its application to plaintiffs.

The Court need only read

the forfeiture provisions in Longhine v. Bilson, 159 Misc. Ill,
-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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287 N.Y.S. 281 (1936) and Kenneke v. First National Bank of
Chicago, 105 111. App. 3d 630, 434 N.E.2d 495 (1982) to find
equally expansive language which those courts refused to apply to
circumstances outside the parties1 reasonable anticipation.

See

also discussion in Lucas v. Seagrove, 277 F. Supp. 338, 342-46
(D. Minn. 1967).
CONCLUSION
Defendant has raised no argument which rebutts plaintiff's
four-part analysis showing that plaintiff's are entitled to the
relief sought.

Plaintiffs are entitled to a reversal of the

District Court's Order granting Summary Judgment to defendant and
denying plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this (jy^

day of August, 1985.

FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation
Attorneys for PlaintiffsAppellants
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